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SUMMARIES OF THE PRESENTATIONS AT THE EGALS1 SEMINAR 2017 
AT KATOWICE UNIVERSITY, POLAND 
 
Subjecthood and Personhood: An Evolutionary Perspective 
by Dr. Andrzej Elżanowski* 
 
Most if not all vertebrates and probably some other Metazoa (animals as currently defined in science), 
are sentient. Sentience is the outcome of converting biological values into good (positive) or bad 
(negative) experience. The good or bad experiences (feelings) are generated in a vertebrate brain by 
dedicated structures in response to exposure to biologically beneficial or detrimental factors that impact 
Darwinian fitness. In order to be effective as a reward or punishment for biologically productive or 
counterproductive behaviors, an experience must be associated with its source object or event. This is 
what consciousness is about. Sentience is the experiential aspect of consciousness. In operational terms, 
consciousness is the identification of an object or event using its mental (central) representation. A 
positive or negative representation motivates appetitive or agonistic behaviors. Having such 
representations identifies a being as a subject, and acting upon them – as an agent.  
Sentience conveys individual interests. Every subject/agent strives to maximize the positive 
(gratifying) and to minimize the negative (punitive) experience and thus has an interest in everything that 
allows her/him to achieve that goal. An interest is the positive value of future actions or events for a 
subject. In line with Western philosophies of law (Hans Kelsen, Alf Ross, Neil MacCormick, Leon 
Petrażycki) having interests is a sufficient condition for the capacity to hold legal rights. Vertebrates (and 
possibly some other animals as far as their sentience is demonstrated by science) ought to be granted 
legal rights and thus be treated as subjects rather objects of law. 
However, the recent attempts to extend legal rights beyond Homo sapiens focused on a few 
mammalian species that share with humans at least basic cognitive faculties of persons: rationality 
(Boethius, Aquinas, Kant) which, in the basic sense, manifests itself as a conscious choice of means to 
an end and thus requires an understanding of causality; and the mental projection of oneself  through 
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time and space (Locke) which requires reflective self-awareness (the ability to look upon oneself from 
an observer’s perspective). Projection in the past implies knowing (not only having) once own biography 
(as opposed to probably unordered memories of non-personal agents). Most (if not all) capacities limited 
to persons (autonomy, responsibility, language) are contingent upon these two capacities. Reflective self-
awareness as revealed by mirror self-recognition tests, and rationality as revealed by tool production 
and/or spontaneous use, have been demonstrated in the corvid birds (ravens, crows, rooks, magpies, jays 
etc), elephants, dolphins, and all hominids (humans and great apes). Self-projection in time and space 
has been demonstrated at least for the corvids and hominids but seems likely to be used by all named 
birds and mammals. In addition, most if not all of them are capable of empathy, at least the empathic 
concern of their close companions. 
Based on the cognitive attributes of a person, non-human hominids and dolphins (but not 
elephants who are decimated in most parts of their range) have been proposed to be granted the status of 
legal persons. These laudable attempts are intended to breach the species(ist) barrier and certainly help 
to discredit the pervasive human exceptionalism and supremacy. However, in the long term this strategy 
has at least three drawbacks: (1) The concept of a legal person is largely coextensive with the legal subject 
and not predicated, at least explicitly or directly, on any cognitive capacities, which is why chimps were 
refused the status of legal persons. (2) A consensus on the definition of a person is not in sight because a 
stepwise evolutionary assembly of the personal agency is still under study and because of the heavy bias 
in the use of personhood in predominantly anthropocentric bioethics. (3) Most important, ethical 
personocentrism contradicts the equal consideration of (many) interests and assumes that persons are 
categorically more valuable. In fact, it is unclear why the life of a person should be a priori more valuable 
than the life of a non-personal subject. Personhood is a self-aware but not necessarily a good agency. At 
least in primates, it does not translate into “moral” or social goodness, and the evolutionary advent of 
personhood and simple (proto)morality coincides with the advent of true cruelty as observed in the 
chimps. Consequently, since the origins of genus Homo over 2 ma, the enormous amount of suffering 
inflicted by humans (to themselves and other vertebrates) may exceed the suffering in nature (non-human 
predators, weather etc.). Neither does personhood increase the intrinsic value of a life. Peter Singer’s 
claim ”that to be harmed by the loss of future, an entity should be aware of itself as having a future” is 
mistaken and has been widely criticized. 
In conclusion, all subjects (sentient beings), not only persons, should be immediately granted 
some, even if limited, legal rights. In addition to fundamental (ethical) reasons (as outlined above), at 




least three practical considerations support this conclusion: (1) whether personal or not, all non-human 
subjects have to be represented by guardians; (2) having interests is much more straightforward than any 
personal attributes; (3) public support for limited legal rights of all non-human subjects would be boosted 
by human bonds with companion animals whose interests are evident even to some lawyers and law-
makers. 
 
The Hopes and Failures of Animal Dereification 
by Tomasz Pietrzykowski* 
 
According to article 1 of the Polish Animal Protection Act of 1997, “an animal, as a living creature 
capable of suffering, is not a thing. Man owes it respect, protection and care. 2. In matters not regulated 
by specific provisions of this act the rules on things shall apply, as appropriate, to animals”. 
The point of this provision is the so-called dereification of animals. This term has been coined 
from the Latin word “res” meaning “thing”. Hence, animal de-reification in this sense means making an 
animal no longer a thing in law. Similar rules have been passed in many other countries in Europe and 
elsewhere – Austria (1988), Germany (1990), Switzerland (2003) and France (2015).  It is noteworthy 
that in many countries the relevant provisions are included in civil codes and therefore seem to modify 
the status of animals in private law only. Contrariwise, the location of the clause within Polish legislation 
makes it affect the status of animals in all branches of law. 
Adoptions of dereification clauses were usually accompanied by high expectations, in particular 
on the part of pro-animal activists and the public opinion. Many believed that it was a decisive step 
forward – if not an epoch-making breakthrough in the development of animal rights. Others, however, 
approached it more skeptically, pointing out that dereification unaccompanied by other legislative 
changes would probably remain a noble ideological declaration with no significant effect on the actual 
legal practice. 
After 20 years, it has become clear that the scepticism was well-justified. Although general 
standards of animal protection have been gradually increasing over time, it does not seem that such legal 
progress is in any significant way related to the act of dereification. In Poland, the very rule dereifying 
animals is often invoked in legal and public discourse but does not seem to have had any material effects 
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on either actual legal practice or social attitudes. Several important rulings of the highest Polish courts in 
recent years have also lent support to the view that dereification actually turned out to be inconsequential. 
A good example of such a landmark case may be the judgment of the Supreme Court pertaining 
to the question of the animal as a victim of illegal conduct. Polish law allows pro-animal NGOs to partake 
in criminal proceedings and “exercise the rights of a victim” of a crime or an offence against animals 
(such as animal abuse or unlawful killing). The Supreme Court resolved that an animal must not be 
legally regarded as a victim (whose rights in the proceedings are exercised by an NGO) because it is not 
a person in law. Thus, an NGO entering criminal proceedings must be held as exercising the rights of an 
owner or a caretaker of an animal as the formal victim wronged by such crimes (V KK 370/13, 2014). 
Similarly, jurisprudence as well as legal practice supported by popular legal consciousness 
continue to regard animals as legitimate objects of regular ownership, sale or storage, as if they were 
ordinary commodities. All standard private law transactions are executed and performed principally in 
the same way as for any other kinds of property. In private law doctrine, it is pointed out that, despite 
animal dereification, „the difference between the content of the right to an animal and ordinary property 
rights is neither theoretically nor practically significant” (M. Goettel, Sytuacja zwierzęcia w prawie 
cywilnym (situation of animal in private law). Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer 2013, p. 423). 
The most striking example of the actual immateriality of dereification is the famous judgment 
of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 2014 (K 52/13) on the ritual slaughter of animals (being one of 
the most shameful and compromising legal mistakes in the whole history of the court in question). The 
decision was based on the argument that, while the Constitution protects the freedom of practicing 
religious rituals, animal welfare is not a legal value of constitutional rank. The concern for animals could 
limit religious freedom only as a part of the constitutional concept of ”morality” but – according to the 
Tribunal – the moral relevance of animal suffering remains unsettled to this day (!). Irrespective of all 
such bizarre findings produced by the Tribunal, what seems crucial here is that, in its whole reasoning, 
it did not even mention the dereification clause. On the contrary, it did not find it an obstacle to conceive 
animals as practically nothing more than objects of constitutionally protected religious rituals. 
All this raises the question whether dereification is inherently futile or just not construed 
correctly, due to a lack of sufficient theoretical elaboration. My tentative answer to that question is that 
the present situation of animals could significantly be improved by means of a much more extensive and 
assertive interpretation of the legal consequences implied in the present dereification clauses. In the long 
run, however, the legal status of animals should be upgraded to non-personal subjects of law by means 




of a properly drafted constitutional amendment, without which the clear limitations of the sole statutory 
dereification cannot be overcome. 
 
Protection of Animal Dignity in Swiss Law 
by Gieri Bolliger* 
 
With regard to animal welfare law, Switzerland has repeatedly assumed a pioneering role. This is 
reflected, for example, in the fact that animal welfare has been one of its constitutionally protected 
national objectives for over forty years. Furthermore, the Swiss Animal Welfare Act (AWA) is generally 
considered one of the most progressive and strict in the world.  
The AWA protects not only the well-being of animals but also their dignity. In 1992, Switzerland 
amended its Federal Constitution by adding a provision requiring the legislature to pass laws on the use 
of reproductive and genetic material from animals, plants, and other organisms, and in doing so, to take 
into account the "dignity of living beings", including animal dignity. Following the introduction of this 
constitutional provision, in 2008, protection of animal dignity was enshrined in the AWA. Originally, 
animal dignity was a theological and philosophical concept that now, after its implementation into 
legislation, represents a fundamental principle as well as a main purpose of Swiss animal welfare law.  
The concept of animal dignity protection is based on the conviction that animals are not primarily 
in the world for human interests. On the contrary, they exist for their own sake and are to be legally 
protected in their species-specific characteristics, needs, and behaviors as well as in their inherent worth, 
which provides animals protection beyond their physical and mental well-being. This concept is still 
unique in the world and represents a biocentric expansion of Swiss law by granting animals a moral value 
irrespective of their sentience. It signifies protection of an animal's inherent worth including ethical (non-
sentientist) aspects that are not necessarily associated with any physical and mental injury, such as 
humiliation, excessive instrumentalization, and substantial interference with an animal's appearance or 
abilities. Going far beyond the pure sentientist protection from pain, suffering, harm, and anxiety, the 
concept represents – both for animal welfare and animal welfare law – a new dimension in animal law 
in general and has drawn tremendous attention and interest from all over the world.  
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Against the background of animal dignity protection, the Swiss legislature passed a number of 
reforms and amendments including a criminal provision. Since 2008, the AWA explicitly prohibits the 
disregard for animal dignity and includes a criminal offense for this in the rank of animal cruelty. This is 
equal to other severe animal welfare crimes, such as mistreatment, neglect, cruel or mischievous killing, 
or abandonment. Under the AWA, anyone who, for example, "mistreats, neglects, unnecessarily 
overexerts an animal, or disregards its dignity in any other way" commits an act of animal cruelty (article 
26, paragraph 1, litera a AWA). As seen, disregarding animal dignity "in any other way" includes, for 
instance, humiliation, excessive instrumentalization, or substantial interference with an animal's 
appearance or abilities as long as there is no justification by prevailing interests. The statutory language 
clarifies that the mistreatment, neglect, or unnecessary overexertion of animals also constitute a disregard 
for their dignity. All animal cruelty cases in Switzerland qualify as misdemeanors and are penalized with 
a custodial sentence (imprisonment) of up to three years or a monetary penalty that can amount, 
depending on the offender's income, at least theoretically, up to more than one million Swiss francs.  
However, in contrast to human dignity, animal dignity is given only a relative value in Swiss law, 
meaning that violations of animal dignity can usually be balanced out and legally justified by prevailing 
human interests. As a result, also in Switzerland, there are a number of highly questionable uses of 
animals that are still considered legitimate and are neither subject to legal scrutiny nor essentially 
questioned by society. Consequently, highly debatable practices, such as animal experiments, the 
intensive keeping of farmed animals, or the presentation of wild animals in circuses, are legally restricted 
– maybe more than elsewhere – but are still permitted. In other words, Swiss law still legitimizes the use 
of animals in general, and even the national animal welfare law itself contains numerous provisions that 
allow severe harm to animals for various "intended uses".  
Significant deficits exist not only in Swiss legislation, but also in the enforcement of the animal 
dignity concept by the cantonal criminal and administrative authorities. Protection of animal dignity is 
still hardly reflected in judicial decisions, and even in criminal cases in which offenders obviously violate 
absolute animal welfare prohibitions (for example cases of zoophilia), judicial authorities barely 
recognize and address the forbidden activities as disregarding animal dignity. Furthermore, judgments 
on the non-sentientist aspects of animal dignity are still almost non-existent. The criminal authorities 
seem to refrain from addressing and sanctioning activities that are not necessarily associated with pain, 
suffering, harm, or anxiety for animals. However, neither from a constitutional standpoint nor from an 
animal welfare view, is it acceptable that the statutory animal cruelty offense of disregard for animal 




dignity is largely ignored in practice. As a result, there is a lack of lawsuits concerning even obvious 
disregards for animal dignity, such as excesses in animal breeding or unnatural performances of wild 
animals in circuses. This is even more troubling as animal dignity protection represents a central purpose 
of Swiss animal welfare law, while its disregard, like any other animal cruelty, constitutes an offense that 
must be prosecuted and punished ex officio by the competent authorities. 
These circumstances clarify the urgent need for better education of Swiss law enforcement 
authorities regarding animal welfare law in general and the meaning and significance of the animal 
dignity concept in particular. Additionally, an increase in awareness of animal dignity protection is 
essential in Swiss society as a whole, especially since offenders can only be prosecuted if the competent 
authorities are informed about criminal acts, and this requires willingness to file criminal charges by 
attentive and educated citizens.  
Animal dignity protection is a relatively new concept and the possible implications have yet to be 
fully understood. This takes time and patience, but various positive incipient stages in Swiss animal law 
are obvious. Even if the recognition of animal dignity neither signifies that the use of animals by humans 
is essentially questioned nor that animals are provided with their own rights, the animal dignity concept 
unquestionably represents a milestone for animal welfare law. With this fundamental new approach, 
Switzerland has taken an ambitious and farsighted step forward into a new sphere of legal animal 
protection. Admittedly, there are still many other – and perhaps more important – animal welfare issues 
to be solved than protecting animals from non-physical stresses such as humiliation or excessive 
instrumentalization. However, the animal dignity concept includes a programmatic dimension, the 
importance of which should not be underestimated. Protection of animal dignity has a strong appellative 
character and the respective demands from humans are not only scientific objectivity and logic, but also 
empathy and a deep personal commitment when assessing an animal's interests. One can assume that 
once the animal dignity concept has found broad acceptance, both within society and legal institutions, 
general awareness of the need to protect animals from any kind of cruelty will rise enormously. In other 
words, a progressive animal welfare concept like Swiss animal dignity protection can indeed prove to be 
the motor of change in societal perceptions that subsequently pave the way for further developments in 
animal welfare legislation and the interpretation of other laws as well as for improvements in jurisdiction. 
Protection of animal dignity delivers an important message: Swiss law acknowledges animals as 
autonomous beings with an inherent worth that must be protected for their own sake and not merely as a 
reflection of their owners' rights. Against the background of an increasingly and highly welcomed 




international collaboration in animal law matters, the Swiss animal dignity concept can hopefully serve 
as a role model for other countries, regardless of terminology.  
 
For more information see Gieri Bolliger, Animal Dignity Protection in Swiss Law – Status Quo and 
Future Perspectives, Zurich 2016. 
 
The Principle of Proportionality in Animal Experimentation – A Dead Letter? 
by Katerina Stoykova* 
 
The principle of proportionality is embedded in almost every national legal system and is consequently 
a fundamental principle of Swiss law, including Swiss animal experimentation law. It requires that 
measures in the public interest be weighed up against encroachments on private – i.e. individual – 
interests or fundamental rights. The Swiss Federal Constitution enshrines this principle in Article 5 
(principles of the rule of law): “State action must be in the public interest and proportionate.” In general, 
the principle states that a measure must be a suitable or appropriate as well as a necessary means of 
asserting a public interest, and it has to be weighed against the interference with the private interests 
concerned. Consequently, the purpose and the effect of a measure or intervention must be proportionate. 
In other words, measures of low public interest that constitute at the same time a serious interference 
with individual liberties and rights must be avoided. In addition, the principle stipulates that, in the case 
of several possible measures which are all in the public interest, the milder measure should always be 
given preference. Lastly, the conflicting interests must be weighed against each other to determine 
whether the end justifies the means.  
Fundamental rights can be interfered with if this is necessary to protect other constitutional 
rights or fulfill constitutional responsibilities. With regard to animal experimentation, the fundamental 
right of academic freedom (Article 20 of the Federal Constitution) may, under certain circumstances, 
need to be restricted because the government is constitutionally required to ensure animal welfare (Article 
80 of the Federal Constitution) and the observance of the dignity of living beings is a constitutional 
principle (Article 120, Paragraph 2, of the Federal Constitution).  
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Thus, the rules of animal experimentation law result from this weighing up of interests on a constitutional 
level: animal welfare and animal dignity are specifically protected by the Animal Welfare Act, which 
stipulates in Articles 3 and 4 that animal dignity is violated when stress is imposed on an animal without 
justification on grounds of prevailing interests and that no one shall inflict pain, suffering, harm or anxiety 
in an animal or disregard its dignity in any other way without justification. This goes to show that animal 
experiments cannot be justified solely through the objectives pursued, but are, at least in theory, subject 
to a rigorous proportionality assessment.  
This means that every planned animal experiment must be weighed up against the interference 
with the wellbeing and dignity of the animal involved by means of a so-called harm-benefit analysis. In 
other words, the specific interests on the research side, which are conclusively defined in Article 137 
Paragraph 1 of the Animal Welfare Ordinance, must be balanced against the stress on the animal resulting 
from the experiment so that it can be determined whether the desired objective of the experiment justifies 
the means and the adverse effect, respectively, on animal welfare.  
To assess whether an experiment is justified, it is necessary to carry out a three-stage 
proportionality test, whereby the experiment is evaluated with regard to its suitability and necessity and 
the conflicting interests are weighed against each other by means of a harm-benefit analysis. All three 
requirements must be satisfied cumulatively – i.e., the experiment must be suitable and necessary and 
the anticipated benefit must outweigh the harm caused to the animal(s) – or else the experiment, at least 
in theory, cannot and must not be approved by the licensing authority.  
First, the licensing authority must assess whether the experiment is suitable for providing 
answers to the questions posed by the applicant. A distinction is made between direct and indirect 
suitability: the former states whether the specific method/experiment is suitable for achieving the desired 
result in the animal at hand, while the latter answers the basic question whether the acquired data is 
transferable to humans (or other animals).  
Unfortunately, both the direct and indirect suitability of an experiment are rarely, if ever, 
questioned by the authorities, despite the fact that it is usually unclear whether a certain animal is an 
adequate testing subject in a specific experiment or if an experiment will give a satisfactory answer to a 
particular question (e.g., is a frustrated mouse a suitable subject to examine the causes of depression in 
general?), while the transferability rates of the acquired data (from animals to humans or to other animals) 
have been proven to be very low. Furthermore, experiments are generally conducted under isolated 
conditions, therefore making it nearly impossible for them to be reproduced in other environments. The 




authorities are also generally reluctant to carefully scrutinize the quality – i.e., the informative value – of 
a specific experiment in retrospect.  
The question of suitability also includes the distinction between basic and applied research. 
Basic research is experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the 
underlying foundations of phenomena and observable facts, without any particular applications or use in 
view. Applied research is also undertaken to acquire new knowledge; however, it is directed primarily 
towards a specific practical aim or objective. It can hardly be assessed whether any benefits will result 
from the insights gained from basic research and whether there actually are any user interests at hand. 
The application of (positive) insights or the expected benefit gained from basic research is therefore very 
uncertain, which is why the question of suitability in this respect can almost never be answered positively. 
And yet, despite this, the licensing authorities rarely reject applications both for applied and basic 
research with animals.  
This is in particular due to the composition of the committees on animal testing. Every Swiss 
canton has its own committee, which is composed of a certain number of representatives of research, 
animal welfare, and ethics and/or a veterinarian. In the canton of Zurich, the committee on animal testing 
consists of seven representatives of the University and Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), an ethicist, 
three animal welfarists (currently with expertise in veterinary medicine, biology, and legal sciences), and 
a veterinarian. This imbalance clearly shows why animal experiments are hardly ever considered 
unsuitable.  
The second stage of the proportionality assessment aims to determine whether the experiment 
is necessary at all. In general, every animal experiment is subject to the 3R principle, according to which 
available methods must be applied to replace, reduce, and refine animal use. The licensing authority must 
thereby examine whether the applicant has rightly ruled out the use of alternative methods, i.e. those that 
do not involve the use of animals. The Animal Welfare Act also specifically requires the government to 
promote alternative methods. However, government funding for the development of alternative research 
is still extremely low compared to the funds provided for experiments involving animals (currently the 
government spends approx. 76 million Swiss Francs on research in general, often comprising animal 
experiments, while the specific funding of alternative methods that amounted to a mere 300.000 Swiss 
Francs was discontinued in 2016. Even though, according to the Federal Food Safety and Veterinary 
Office, greater attention is to be given to alternative research in the future, the question as to when, how, 
and in what form the federal government intends to fulfill its mandate remains unclear.  




If the authority concludes that the planned experiment is suitable and necessary to achieve the 
objective, it must balance the conflicting interests and determine whether the user interests outweigh the 
interests of the animals involved by means of a so-called harm-benefit analysis. Because it is virtually 
impossible to predict whether the experiment will yield a benefit or lead to the desired goal, it is very 
difficult to balance such potential user interests and the evident interests of the animals involved in being 
spared stress, pain, fear, anxiety, etc. This is especially true for basic research where no tangible 
application can be anticipated a priori.  
Accordingly, a recent case concerning the authorization of basic research on primates in Zurich, 
Switzerland, led to a huge public outcry. In 2009, two experiments with primates were forbidden by the 
Supreme Court, which held that the anticipated benefits are so unclear that they can in no way justify the 
certain harm inflicted on the animals. Despite this precedent case, in 2017, the Zurich committee on 
animal testing approved a new application for basic research on primates by a researcher at the Federal 
Institute of Technology. This is particularly disturbing because not only is there a precedent set by the 
Supreme Court, but the current experiment is also very similar to the one that had been planned in the 
2009 case. This goes to show just how political and arbitrary the decisions of the licensing authorities 
are. In Zurich, the members of the committee on animal testing are selected by the State Council, which, 
after the 2009 setback for animal experimentation, did everything possible to establish a more research-
oriented composition of the committee to ensure Zurich remains a popular site for scientific research.  
In conclusion, it must be stated that, in theory, the interests of the animals and those of the user, i.e. the 
researcher and humans in general, have equal constitutional status and severe harm or pain cannot be 
justified by any benefit whatsoever. In practice, however, the decision-making bodies follow a very 
research-oriented approach and hardly ever raise ethical questions when assessing applications for animal 
experiments. This leads to very one-sided decisions and the entire three-stage proportionality assessment 








What Is Animal Law? 
by Birgitta Wahlberg* 
 
Animal law is globally taking shape as a new area of law. Thereby also the theoretical ground of the 
subject and the teaching of the subject is under development. Partly due to the failure of the concept of 
‘animal welfare legislation’ and protection of animals as objects of law, the legal questions and cause of 
concerns are increasingly raised in society concerning the protection and legal status of  animals. At the 
crossroads of different disciplines animal law jurisprudence has to respond both to the theoretical and 
practical legal questions raised. This, in turn, has an impact on how we understand and what we teach as 
‘Animal Law’.  
The aim of this presentation was to raise awareness of the ongoing process of development in 
the field of animal law and to make some preliminary thoughts and outlines of future development areas. 
As animal law is at the forefront of its development and have not yet established its place in the field of 
different law disciplines, these outlines must also be read from that viewpoint. 
Currently animal law is taught in several universities and there are hundreds of animal law 
courses arranged annually around the globe (Animal Law Courses Globally: 
https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1Hdgt9cZy_JxSsv0QnAmJ_xAKQbU&ll=14.42242218
1857963%2C-83.65962209999992&z=2). Animal law, as taught at present, mainly explores the content, 
interpretation and application of the animal protection legislation in force on different levels of law 
(constitutional, domestic, state)  and/or the outcomes of current case law (including litigation). In other 
words, exploring the law as de lege lata. Yet, some animal law courses includes fundamental questions 
about the relation between human (homo sapiens) and nonhuman legal positions, and explores the nature, 
history and impact of legal rights and/or interests on animals and on human-nonhuman legal relations. 
Thereby, in other words, also using de lege ferenda arguments. 
Thus, substantially the majority of the animal law classes taught at present are focused on an 
‘animal welfare and protection law’ point of view, overlapping with traditional areas and theories of law, 
and a minority of the courses are focused on an ‘animal rights or interest law’ point of view, or other 
aspects of law which have an impact on animals lives or living conditions. Accordingly, a general 
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perception is that ‘Animal Law’ is the same as ‘animal protection’, – as animal protection is taken care 
of in legal terms in different legal systems –, often combined with some ethical questions concerning the 
use of animals for human purposes. Since there is no existing, common, global and established definition 
of ‘Animal Law’, in practice, each teacher can define ‘Animal Law’ as they want or choose not to define 
it at all. 
However, the denotation of how animal law is defined has a significant impact on our 
understanding of the field of law and on how the content is taught to students, – comprehending the basic 
understandings and theories (which are fundamentally quite similar regardless of the legal system, e.g. 
questions combined with animals legal status) and more specific legal themes and questions of concern 
(which can be quite different based on different legal systems). Thus, it is fundamentally important, at 
this stage of development, that the following questions are  considered by the EGALS: Is animal law  
part of any traditional field of law which relates to animals (depending also on the questions raised and 
methods used in research), or is it – or should it be – consciously developed into an specific field of law 
such as e.g. environmental law? To simplify, what makes animal law to ‘Animal Law’? 
The peculiarity of animal law in relation to other fields of law and disciplines of science can be 
summarized into four points; 1) animal law comprises legal matters concerning non-human animals (only 
animals hereafter) from an non-anthropocentric point of view taking into account animals welfare, 
interests and rights – i.e. implying that the legal questions related to animals are to be considered from a 
zoocentric perspective (which facilitates the interests of all species thoroughly taken into account), 2) 
animal law is multidisciplinary, in a sense that all the legal questions cannot be answered without 
knowledge from other fields of science such as e.g. natural science, political science and science of 
economics, 3) animal law is ’multijurisprudential’, meaning that even though animal law is, or should be 
considered as a specific field of law and jurisprudence, the theories from other fields of law such as e.g. 
constitutional law, administration law, environmental law and criminal law, as well as the theories of 
different legal systems, are needed for the protection of animals – both in the spectrum of the ’welfare’ 
concept as of the ’interest’ and ’right’ concept – and the development of animal law as a new field of law 
and jurisprudence, 4) The fundamental theoretical legal questions which are raised within the framework 
of animal law is of international matter, e.g. the legal status of animals and its impact on the protection 
of animals.  
The division of different areas of law and their content and theories are constantly evolving by 
nature rather than to be permanent and unchangeable. The legal science subject currently called ’Animal 




Law’ is partly reasserting animals legal position, partly describing and explaining the content, 
interpretation and enforcement of the legislation concerning the protection of animals, while the theory 
of animal law should explore the theoretical basic assumptions of the research subject (animals) and the 
fundamental questions in relation to that subject,  – as the essence of ‘Animal Law’. In other words, to 
summarize, the content of ‘Animal Law’ should relate to the theoretical understandings and practical 
issues of animal protection as an own subject within the jurisprudence.  
Animal law – or should it actually be called Animal Jurisprudence – provides legal knowledge 
and understanding of animals and establishes a fundament for practical animal law issues to be solved. 
As animal jurisprudence it should include at least three focus areas or branches: the animal welfare and 
protection area, the animal rights area and the area of regulations which are secondary to animals, but 
that involves, affects, or implicates on animals by regulating about human actions without imposing 
either indirect and enforceable duties upon humans to treat animals in a certain way or granting rights to 
animals themselves. All these three areas of law and regulation should be reviewed in classes in the light 
of animals legal status in terms of de lege lata and de lege ferenda. 
How the field of law is understood and taught should provide students and researchers a broad 
picture of the animal jurisprudence, both for the benefit of coexistence between humans and other 
animals, and the development of the subject as part of the science of law.   
